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The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines represent a uniform set of formal rules
that are implemented across a broad range of diverse social
contexts. Drawing from neo-institutional theory and kindred perspectives
on criminal courts, we argue that the federal courts represent an
organizational field in which local influences play a key role in conformity
to institutional rules. We use unique survey data from federal judges,
aggregated to the district court level and combined with individual-level
federal sentencing data, to examine hierarchical models of judicial
departures from the Guidelines. Our analysis includes more proximate
measures of court community culture than prior research. We find that the
collective views of federal judges, including their perceptions of the degree
of regulative constraint posed by the Guidelines, as well as the extent to
which the Guidelines are normatively and morally legitimate, are intimately
related to variation in judicial Guidelines departures across district courts.
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The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA.
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INTRODUCTION
Scholarly research on organizational legitimacy, legal authority, and
conformity to formalized rules represents an enduring cornerstone of
sociological inquiry. At the same time, recent scholarship on the sociology
of punishment underscores the broad societal consequences of criminal
punishment,1 in part because the exercise of state-sponsored social control
is “shaped by an ensemble of social forces and has a significance and range
of effects that reach well beyond the population of criminals.”2 Court actors
must continually navigate the delicate balance between formally-structured
rules and informal normative expectations.3 Examining organizational

1
Darrell Steffensmeier et al., Ethnicity and Sentencing Outcomes in U.S. Federal
Courts: Who is Punished More Harshly?, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 705, 718 (2000).
2
David Garland, Sociological Perspectives on Punishment, 14 CRIME AND JUST. 115,
119 (1991).
3
JAMES EISENSTEIN ET AL., THE CONTOURS OF JUSTICE: COMMUNITIES AND THEIR
COURTS 30–36 (1st ed. 1988).
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conformity within criminal courts thus provides a unique opportunity to
investigate the socio-legal clash of standardized decision-making rules and
localized cultural norms across court contexts.4
The federal justice system, in particular, is well-suited to an analysis of
organizational conformity within the criminal courts. In 1984, Congress
passed the Federal Sentencing Reform Act, establishing the United States
Sentencing Commission (USSC) and empowering it to promulgate
sentencing guidelines to formally structure criminal sentences for all federal
offenders.5 The goals of the federal Guidelines were to reduce unwarranted
disparity, to ensure severe and uniform punishments, and to increase
rationality and transparency in the federal punishment process.6 The
Guidelines were originally mandatory, recognized as the most rigid and
complex sentencing rules ever enacted.7
However, in United States v. Booker8 in 2005, the Supreme Court
ruled that the Guidelines would thereafter be advisory.9 Although federal
judges still had to calculate and consider the Guidelines, they were no
longer legally mandated to follow them.10 This change might mean less
consistency and uniformity in sentencing between district courts. Recent
research evidence, however, suggests that despite the fact that the
Guidelines are only advisory now, they continue to shape federal
punishments; that is, their legal and normative constraining power remains
intact.11 However, this also raises important questions about local variations
4
Jeffery T. Ulmer, The Localized Uses of Federal Sentencing Guidelines in Four U.S.
District Courts: Evidence of Processual Order, 28 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 255, 272–76
(2005).
5
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING: AN
ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE
GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM iv (2004), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/
research-and-publications/research-projects-and-surveys/miscellaneous/15-year-study/15_
year_study_full.pdf.
6
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2012 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: CONTINUING IMPACT OF
UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 12 (2012), http://www.ussc.gov/news/
congressional-testimony-and-reports/booker-reports/report-continuing-impact-united-statesv-booker-federal-sentencing [hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2012 REPORT].
7
KATE STITH & JOSE CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS 2–4 (1998).
8
543 U.S. 220 (2005).
9
Id. at 222. Booker, along with subsequent decisions such as Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 38–39 (2007), significantly expanded federal judges’ sentencing discretion.
10
Gall, 552 U.S. at 45–46.
11
Jeffery T. Ulmer et al., The “Liberation” of Federal Judges’ Discretion in the Wake
of the Booker/Fanfan Decision: Is There Increased Disparity and Divergence between
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in court actor perceptions of the Guidelines, and judicial conformity to
them, as local court actors use their discretion to selectively deviate from
formal rules and policies imposed from above.
A primary example of organizational deviation occurs when federal
judges “depart” by sentencing an offender to a punishment that falls outside
the recommendations of the Guidelines.12 Departures can occur in several
ways. Some departures reflect prosecutorial discretion, such as departures
for “substantial assistance” to the government in the prosecution of another
case, government-sponsored departures that involve binding plea
agreements, or pleas where a defense departure motion is not opposed by
the government.13 Other departures are initiated explicitly by judicial
discretion.14 Judges can sentence offenders outside the recommended
sentencing ranges in accordance with special sentencing considerations laid
out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which became especially relevant after the
Guidelines became advisory.15

Courts?, 28 JUST. Q. 799, 830 (2011); Amy Farrell et al., Examining District Variation in
Sentencing in the Post-Booker Period, 23 FED. SENTENCING REP. 318, 320 (2011); Sonja B.
Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: Assessing the Role of
Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L. J. 2, 27 (2013).
12
In the post-Booker era, a distinction can be made between “departures” and
“deviations.” In this terminology, departures are sentences that are above or below the
Guideline range given for reasons that the USSC recognizes as legitimate. Substantial
assistance and government-sponsored departures are of this class, as are certain judgeinitiated departures (5K2). Deviations from the Guidelines, however, are judge-initiated
departure sentences that are not given in accordance with these factors—for example, a
deviation from the Guidelines based on a judge’s policy disagreement with the Guidelines.
Kimberly A. Kaiser & Cassia Spohn, “Fundamentally Flawed” Exploring the Use of Policy
Disagreements in Judicial Downward Departures for Child Pornography Sentences, 13
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 241, 246–47 (2014). Prior to the Rita and Gall decisions,
departures were permitted (but appealable) but deviations were not. In this paper, we
combine both deviations and departures into our conceptualization of departures in the postBooker context, since we are interested in the Guidelines as institutional rules and standards
that courts can interpret in different ways. We thank an anonymous reviewer for helping us
clarify these distinctions.
13
Cassia Spohn & Robert Fornango, U.S. Attorneys and Substantial Assistance
Departures: Testing for Interprosecutor Disparity, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 813, 834–38 (2009).
14
Rodney L. Engen & Randy R. Gainer, Modeling the Effects of Legally Relevant and
Extralegal Factors Under Sentencing Guidelines: The Rules Have Changed, 38
CRIMINOLOGY 1207, 1220–22 (2000).
15
The categories of factors that can be considered under §3553(a) include the following:
1) special offense and offender characteristics, 2) the need to reflect the basic aims and goals
of sentencing, 3) consideration of the sentences that are legally available, 4) the sentencing
guidelines, 5) sentencing commission policy statements, 6) the need to avoid unwarranted
disparity, and 7) the need for restitution. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2010).
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Prior work has examined organizational conformity and departures
from sentencing guidelines at both the state and federal level,16 but none of
this work incorporates local court actor perceptions or attitudes towards
their institutional environments. Our study incorporates measures of the
collective attitudes and perceptions of federal judges towards the
Sentencing Guidelines. This research combines insights from organizational
sociology with empirical work on the social contexts of criminal
punishment. Using unique national survey data from federal judges, which
is aggregated to the district level and combined with individual-level
sentencing data, we examine organizational forces that affect judicial
deviations from the Guidelines. We then supplement these data with
material from qualitative interviews with federal judges, prosecutors,
defense attorneys, and probation officers to shed additional insight into
reasons behind conformity to and deviation from the Guidelines, and how
departure decisions are embedded in local court contexts.
I. THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT SYSTEM AS AN ORGANIZATIONAL FIELD
The federal courts can be seen as an organizational field.17
Organizational fields are “sets of interacting groups, organizations, and
agencies oriented around a common substantive interest.”18 They are
bounded by the presence of a common regulatory system or shared
normative (systems of formal or informal social norms) or culturalcognitive frameworks (systems of cultural and cognitive meanings).19
16

See, e.g., Celesta A. Albonetti, Direct And Indirect Effects Of Case Complexity,
Guilty Plea, And Offender Characteristics On Sentencing For Offenders Convicted Of A
White-Collar Offense Prior To Sentencing Guidelines, 14 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY
353, 353 (1998); Rodney L. Engen et al., Discretion and Under Guidelines: The Role of
Departures and Structured Sentencing Alternatives, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 99, 107 (2003); Brian
Johnson et al., The Social Context of Guideline Circumvention: The Case of Federal District
Courts, 46 CRIMINOLOGY 737 (2008); John H. Kramer et al., Sentencing Disparity and
Guidelines Departures, 13 JUST. Q. 81 (1996); John H. Kramer et al., Downward Departures
for Serious Violent Offenders: Local Court “Corrections” to Pennsylvania’s Sentencing
Guidelines, 40 CRIMINOLOGY 897 (2002); David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender
Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J. L. & ECON. 285, 285
(2001); Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study
of Charging and Bargaining Practices under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL.
L. REV. 501, 501 (1992).
17
Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147,
150 (1983).
18
HOWARD E. ALDRICH & MARTIN REUF, ORGANIZATIONS EVOLVING 40 (2d ed. 2006).
19
See W. RICHARD SCOTT, INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS: IDEAS AND INTERESTS 86,
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Fligstein and McAdam refer to these strategic action fields as: “meso level
social order[s] where actors (who can be individual or collective) interact
with knowledge of one another under a set of common understandings
about the purposes of the field, the relationships in the field (including who
has power and why), and the field’s rules.”20 DiMaggio and Powell identify
three types of isomorphism (meaning “similarity of form”)21: coercive,
normative, and mimetic.22 Coercive isomorphism involves forced
compliance, normative isomorphism involves acquiescence through
established norms, behavioral expectations and perceived legitimacy, and
mimetic isomorphism involves conformity through the routine application
of shared cultural-cognitive tools that help reduce uncertainty.23 We view
judicial adherence to the Guidelines (and, alternatively, departures (i.e.,
non-conformity)) from them as an example of the interplay between
organizational isomorphism, conformity, and deviation from institutional
rules.
Importantly, foundations of institutional conformity are not mutually
exclusive and can be intertwined in complex ways.24 The federal Guidelines
likely produce sentencing uniformity by constraining departures through
both coercive and normative influence. For most of their history, a great
deal of the Guidelines’ influence operated through their regulative and
coercive power. Prior to 2005, the Guidelines were mandatory; judges were
required to conform to them or justify why a sentence that departed from
the Guidelines was warranted due to extraordinary circumstances.25 Even
then, the sentence could be appealed by the prosecution or defense, and the
136–38 (3rd ed. 2008).
20
Neil Fligstein & Doug McAdam, Toward a General Theory of Strategic Action
Fields, 29 SOC. THEORY 1, 3 (2011).
21
Calvin Morrill & Cindy McKee, Institutional Isomorphism and Informal Social
Control: Evidence from a Community Mediation Center, 40 SOC. PROBS. 445, 449 (1993).
22
DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 17, at 150.
23
SCOTT, supra note 19, at 160–61 (elaborating on these organizational influences,
identifying three primary influences in organizational conformity: 1) regulative, (i.e.,
coercive isomorphism), which entails coercive pressure toward conformity through
expedience and cost-benefit rationality; 2) normative (i.e., normative isomorphism) in which
organizations conform through normative obligations, expectations, or shared morality; and
3) cultural-cognitive (i.e., mimetic isomorphism) which involves conformity through
common efforts at “sense making); see also KARL WEICK, SENSEMAKING IN ORGANIZATIONS
17 (1995).
24
SCOTT, supra note 19, at 1610–16.
25
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2012 REPORT, supra note 6, at 3, 45; Kate Stith, The Arc of
the Pendulum, Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420,
1423 (2008).
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circuit courts had the power to conduct a de novo review of the sentence.26
Prior to the 2005 Booker decision, the circuit courts gave great deference to
the Guidelines and held high standards for departures.27
But when the Guidelines were rendered advisory by Booker, their
regulative power to restrict departures was substantially weakened.28 Yet,
from 2005 onward, the large majority of federal sentences continued to
conform to the Guidelines, even though they had become merely advisory
and did not have the same mandatory, coercive power.29 This raises the
possibility that the Guidelines do not merely influence court actors through
regulative constraint but also through informal normative influence. In line
with this, Scott suggests that in situations when legal constraint is reduced
or ambiguous, the “law is better conceived of as an occasion for sensemaking and collective interpretation, relying more on cognitive and
normative than coercive elements for its effects.”30 This suggests that the
extent to which the advisory Guidelines restrict departures and maintain
organizational uniformity across contexts may depend in large part on
normative influences (as well as mimetic, uncertainty-reducing influences,
to which we return at the end of our analysis). This would occur if the
once-mandatory Guidelines have become embedded in organizational
sentencing practices as expected norms or established informal rules.
For example, the Guidelines might have come to be seen as the
embodiment of best practice sentencing standards—the product of the U.S.
Sentencing Commission’s careful research and prescriptions that bear the
stamp of congressional approval. To the extent that local court actors
conform to the Guidelines because they view them as legitimate and
effective organizational policy, these influences are normative in nature.31

26

De novo review of departure sentences was one feature established by the Feeney
Amendment to the 2003 PROTECT Act from Congress. PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 10821, 117 Stat. 650 (2003).
27
See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 7, at 1463 (discussing the limitations on
discretion in departing from the Guidelines imposed on district court judges by an abuse of
discretion standard of review).
28
Id. at 1481 (discussing the post-Booker shift returning discretion to judges).
29
Paul J. Hofer, United States v. Booker as a Natural Experiment: Using Empirical
Research to Inform the Federal Sentencing Policy Debate, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y
433, 456 (2007); Jeffery T. Ulmer et al., The “Liberation” of Federal Judges’ Discretion in
the Wake of the Booker/Fanfan Decision: Is There Increased Disparity and Divergence
between Courts?, supra note 11 at 799, 830; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2012 REPORT, supra
note 6, at 10.
30
SCOTT, supra note 19, at 54.
31
Jeffery T. Ulmer et al., Racial Disparity in the Wake of the Booker/Fanfan Decision:
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Thus, the Guidelines would become benchmarks from which localized
understandings of appropriate “going rates” are established for “normal
crimes.”32 Once the Guidelines become embedded in organizational
sentencing practices as expected norms and informal rules (or “going
rates,)” they are likely to continue to shape punishment even when their
formal regulative power is curtailed.
A. FEDERAL COURTS AS LOCAL “COURT COMMUNITIES”

There are a number of reasons why one might expect considerable
uniformity in sentencing and Guideline conformity across district courts.
High rates of compliance might reflect the substantial regulatory and
normative force of the Guidelines and lead to minimal district-to-district
variation in Guidelines departures across the federal courts. Even though
the Guidelines are advisory, they were once mandatory, and federal law still
requires that they be correctly calculated and considered as a benchmark in
every case.33 The USSC monitors adherence to the Guidelines and trains
federal court officials in the Guidelines’ application, interpretation, and case
law.34 Politically, federal judges—unlike their state-level counterparts—are
appointed for life terms, limiting the potential impact of local political and
reelection concerns.35 Moreover, deep-seated normative themes that
emphasize equal treatment before the law may provide additional incentives
for uniformity in federal punishment, what Eisenstein and associates refer
to as “national legal culture—shared values and attitudes about how persons
charged with crimes should be treated.”36 Finally, at this point in history,
most federal judges have never made sentencing decisions without the

An Alternative Analysis to the USSC’s 2010 Report, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 1081,
1115–16 (2011); Ulmer et al., supra note 11, at 831.
32
David Sudnow, Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal Code in a Public
Defender Office, 12 SOC. PROBS. 255, 260, 262 (1965) (discussing sentencing norms that
develop in courts for offenses organizationally seen by court personnel as “normal crimes.”
Ulmer and Kramer evolved this concept further as the concept of “going rates,” and applied
it in studying the informal use of sentencing guidelines); JEFFERY ULMER, SOCIAL WORLDS
OF SENTENCING: COURT COMMUNITIES UNDER SENTENCING GUIDELINES 173 (1997); JOHN H.
KRAMER & JEFFERY ULMER, SENTENCING GUIDELINES: LESSONS FROM PENNSYLVANIA 120
(2009) [hereinafter KRAMER & ULMER, SENTENCING GUIDELINES].
33
Stith, supra note 25, at 1479–80.
34
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2012 REPORT, supra note 6, at 28–31.
35
Carlos Berdejo et al., Crime, Punishment, and Politics: An Analysis of Political
Cycles in Criminal Sentencing, 95 REV. OF ECON. & STAT. 741, 754 (2013).
36
EISENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 12–13 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Guidelines,37 so many contemporary judges likely rely on the Guidelines as
a guiding constitutive scheme of categories and decision rules.
If the Guidelines constrain court actor behavior based on a mixture of
coercive and normative influences, then why should organizational
conformity vary across contexts? Organizational scholars have identified
several mechanisms through which the same institutional rules result in
differences in organizational conformity.38 These include varying
interpretations of institutional rules, unique cultural influences that affect
local responses to institutional pressures, and specific adaptations,
innovations, and strategic responses by different actors and organizations.39
Although the Guidelines represent a uniform set of formalized rules, they
illustrate a fundamental tension between efforts designed to promote
uniformity in punishment and interests that emphasize flexibility,
individualization, and localization of punishment.40
We argue that U.S. district courts are organizational arenas where
criminal punishments are subject to a set of overarching “field-wide” rules
(the Guidelines) that constrain court actor behavior through a mixture of
regulative/coercive and informal normative influence. Compliance to the
Guidelines, however, can and does vary across district courts. We posit that
part of the explanation for this variation may be that judges in different
contexts differentially interpret and apply the Guidelines in ways that reflect
differences in their perceived normative and coercive influences, as well as
related perceptions of their local organizational environments.
Local variation in the implementation of sentencing policies, such as
sentencing guidelines, is a persistent theme in empirical research on state

37

Celesta A. Albonetti, Judicial Discretion in Federal Sentencing: An Intersection of
Policy Priorities and Law, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 1151, 1152–53 (2011); see also
Stith, supra note 25, at 1424; KRAMER & ULMER, SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 32, at
13.
38
Jo Dixon, The Organizational Context of Criminal Sentencing, 100 AM. J. SOC. 1157,
1183 (1995); SCOTT, supra note 19, at 160–62; Joachim Savelsberg, Law that Does Not Fit
Society: Sentencing Guidelines as a Neoclassical Reaction to the Dilemmas of
Substantivized Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1346, 1355 (1992).
39
Judson G. Everitt, Inhabitants Moving In: Prospective Sense-Making and the
Reproduction of Inhabited Institutions in Teacher Education, 36 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION
177, 193–95 (2013); Fligstein & McAdam, supra note 20, at 4–5; Brian D. Johnson, The
Multilevel Context of Criminal Sentencing: Integrating Judge- and County-Level Influences,
44 CRIMINOLOGY 259, 264–66 (2006).
40
Dixon, supra note 38, at 1167; Kramer et al., Sentencing Disparity and Guidelines
Departures, supra note 16, at 101; Savelsberg, supra note 38, at 1361.
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and federal courts.41 Prior work argues that federal district courts can be
understood as “court communities” that interpret formal institutional rules
in locally-distinctive ways that produce variation in organizational
compliance.42 Scholars in this tradition view courts as unique social worlds,
based on participants’ shared workplace, interdependent working relations
between the prosecutor’s office, judges’ bench, and defense bar, and
importantly, broader social influences from the surrounding environment.43
These court communities exhibit distinctive organizational cultures, which
establish formal and informal case processing and sentencing norms.44
Importantly, court communities are open, not closed, systems—their
contours are shaped by their surrounding sociopolitical and legal
environments.45 Dixon, for instance, argues that dominant case processing
strategies differ across courts according to their social, political, and
organizational contexts.46 More generally, a sizeable number of studies
demonstrate that state and federal court communities’ case processing and
sentencing practices are conditioned by features of their surrounding sociopolitical and organizational contexts.47
Similar arguments have been applied to related areas of the justice
system as well, such as policing. Ingram and his coauthors, for instance,
41

ULMER, SOCIAL WORLDS OF SENTENCING, supra note 32, at 166–67; Dixon, supra note
38, at 1164; Rodney L. Engen & Sara Steen, The Power to Punish: Discretion and
Sentencing Reform in the War on Drugs, 105 AM. J. SOC. 1357, 1383–84 (2000).
42
Paula M. Kautt, Location, Location, Location: Interdistrict and Intercircuit Variation
in Sentencing Outcomes for Federal Drug-Trafficking Offenses, 19 JUST. Q. 633, 641 (2002);
Johnson et al., supra note 16, at 769; Spohn & Fornango, supra note 13, at 819; Jeffery T.
Ulmer et al., Trial Penalties in Federal Sentencing: Extra-Guidelines Factors and District
Variation, 27 JUST. Q. 560, 588 (2010); Amy Anderson et al., Lawlessness In the Federal
Sentencing Process: A Test for Uniformity and Consistency in Sentencing Practices, 27
JUST. Q. 362, 367 (2010).
43
EISENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 35; ROY B. FLEMMING ET AL., THE CRAFT OF
JUSTICE: POLITICS AND WORK IN CRIMINAL COURT COMMUNITIES 10–11 (1992); ULMER,
SOCIAL WORLDS OF SENTENCING, supra note 32, at 27; Jeffery T. Ulmer & Brian Johnson,
Sentencing in Context: A Multilevel Analysis, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 137, 140 (2004).
44
See EISENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 231; Jeffery T. Ulmer & John Kramer, The
Use and Transformation of Formal Decision Making Criteria: Sentencing Guidelines,
Organizational Contexts, and Case Processing Strategies, 45 SOC. PROBS. 248, 251 (1998);
ULMER, SOCIAL WORLDS OF SENTENCING, supra note 32, at 165–68.
45
EISENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 260; ULMER, SOCIAL WORLDS OF SENTENCING,
supra note 32, at 165–68; KRAMER & ULMER, SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 32, at
134–37.
46
Dixon, supra note 38, at 1192.
47
See Jeffery T. Ulmer, Recent Developments and New Directions in Sentencing
Research, 29 JUST. Q. 1, 11–16 (2012).
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maintain that individual police attitudes become amplified into a collective
feature of the police workgroup and department culture.48 Similarly, we
posit that local court organizational culture may be reflected in the
collective attitudes and beliefs of federal court workgroups. Therefore, an
examination of local court actors’ attitudes and beliefs about the Guidelines
and their court environments may provide unique insight into key sources
of variations in federal Guidelines conformity.
B. FEDERAL COURTS, GUIDELINES DEPARTURES, AND CONTEXTUAL
VARIATION IN PUNISHMENT

The vast majority of prior research on the federal courts examines
inequalities associated with markers of social stratification in society, such
as defendant race, ethnicity, gender, or citizenship.49 One important finding
from this work is that each type of Guideline departure represents an
important potential locus of disparity.50 A second key finding is that
between-district variation in federal punishment (including departures) is
common.51 The U.S. Sentencing Commission noted that court disparities
arise from numerous sources including the relative weight placed on
different sentencing factors across regions, variation in case law and court
personnel, and the uniqueness of political climates, local norms, caseloads,
48

Jason Ingram et al., A Multilevel Framework for Understanding Police Culture: The
Role of the Workgroup, 51 THE ROLE OF THE WORKGROUP 365, 372 (2013).
49
Celesta A. Albonetti, Sentencing Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Effects of
Defendant Characteristics, Guilty Pleas, and Departures on Sentence Outcomes for Drug
Offenses, 1991–1992, 31 L. & SOC’Y REV. 789, 798 (1997); Albonetti, supra note 16, at 369–
70; John Hagan et al., The Differential Sentencing of White-Collar Offenders in Ten Federal
District Courts, 45 AM. SOC. REV. 802, 810 (1980); Richard Hartley et al., Prosecutorial
Discretion: An Examination of Substantial Assistance Departures in Federal Crack-Cocaine
and Powder-Cocaine Cases, 24 JUST. Q. 382, 391–92 (2007); Johnson et al., supra note 16,
at 749; Kautt, supra note 42, at 644–45; Spohn & Fornango, supra note 13, at 822;
Steffensmeier et al. supra note 1, at 709; Ulmer et al., supra note 11, at 809; Ulmer et al.,
Racial Disparity in the Wake of the Booker/Fanfan Decision, supra 31, at 1090; U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING, supra note 5, at 120.
50
Albonetti, supra note 49, at 817; Celesta A. Albonetti, The Role of Gender and
Departures in the Sentencing of Defendants Convicted of a White-Collar Offense Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, in SOCIOLOGY OF CRIME, LAW, AND DEVIANCE 3, 37 (Jeffery
T. Ulmer ed., 1998); Johnson et al., supra note 16, at 740–41, 772; Mustard, supra note 16,
at 312.
51
Kautt, supra note 42, at 658; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 5, at 101;
Johnson et al., supra note 16, at 767–68; Mona Lynch & Marissa Omori, Legal Change and
Sentencing Norms in the Wake of Booker: The Impact of Time and Place on Drug
Trafficking Cases in Federal Court, 48 L. & SOC. REV. 411, 411 (2014); Ulmer et al., supra
note 11, at 828.
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and practical constraints in each federal court environment.52
Relatively little empirical work examines the factors that account for
jurisdictional variations in Guidelines conformity.
Prior empirical
scholarship typically controls for, but does not investigate, between-court
variation in sentencing practices.53 Only a few studies provide in-depth
examinations of between-court variation in federal punishment or
Guidelines conformity.54 Kautt, for instance, found significant betweencourt variation in the sentencing of federal drug trafficking cases, but little
of this variation was explained by district-level factors.55 Johnson and his
coauthors reported substantial variation in the use of Guidelines departures
across federal courts.56 They found some evidence for the salience of
caseload pressure and community characteristics, but these effects were
small and inconsistent across types of departure.57 Qualitative interviews in
this work hinted at the importance of local cultural norms and established
organizational routines, but no direct measures of these influences were
available.58 Similar conclusions were described in recent analyses of federal
drug trafficking cases by Lynch and Omori.59 They examined temporal and
jurisdictional variations in federal sentencing tied to the Booker decision
and concluded that “local legal practices not only diverge in important ways
across place, but also become entrenched over time such that top-down
legal reform is largely reappropriated and absorbed into locally established
practices.”60
The organizational perspectives discussed above imply that judges
52

U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 5, at 93.
See, e.g., Hartley et al., supra note 49, at 393; R.S. Everett et al., Difference,
Disparity, and Race, Ethnic Bias in Federal Sentencing, 18 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY
189, 196–98 (2002); Paula Kautt & Cassia Spohn, Cracking Down on Black Drug
Offenders? Testing for Interactions Among Offenders’ Race, Drug Type, and Sentencing
Strategy in Federal Drug Sentences, 19 JUST. Q. 1, 12–13 (2002); Steffensmeier et al., supra
note 1, at 713.
54
Amy Farrell et al., Race Effects of Representation Among Federal Court Workers:
Does Black Workforce Representation Reduce Sentencing Disparities?, 623 ANNALS OF THE
AM. ACAD. OF POL. AND SOC. SCI. 121, 126 (2009); Ben Feldmeyer et al., Racial/Ethnic
Threat and Federal Sentencing, 48 J. RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 238, 248–49 (2011); Johnson
et al., supra note 16, at 754–56; Mona Lynch & Marissa Omori, supra note 51, at 425–26;
Kautt, supra note 42, at 651–53; Ulmer et al., supra note 11, at 810.
55
Kautt, supra note 42, at 658–59.
56
Johnson et al., supra note 16, at 764.
57
Id. at 766.
58
Id. at 769–70.
59
Lynch & Omori, supra note 51, at 439–40.
60
Id. at 411.
53

ULMER_FINAL PROOF_3.30.17

2017]

4/21/2017 3:08 PM

ORGANIZATIONAL CONFORMITY & PUNISHMENT

265

conform to the Guidelines because they experience coercive regulatory
pressure to do so or because they believe in the normative validity of these
rules as useful and valid decision-making tools. The court community
perspective argues, in turn, that these types of organizational influences
may vary significantly across federal district court contexts.61 Although
much prior research recognizes the importance of examining local courts’
organizational environments, including judges’ views of sentencing
guidelines, direct measures of these are routinely absent from empirical
studies of criminal punishment.62 The vast majority of research relies on
coarse aggregate measures of court contextual features, such as court size,
case flow characteristics, or broad community factors like the proportion of
the population belonging to certain minority groups.63 Although these are
all theoretically salient, none of them tap directly into the attitudinal
environment of federal court judges toward important institutional rules
such as the Guidelines.
To address this issue, the current study utilizes unique survey data
from federal judges to construct measures of collective perceptions of the
normative and coercive influences of the Guidelines. Judge-initiated
departures represent a lack of organizational conformity—criminal cases
that are sentenced outside the recommended Guidelines ranges (for
whatever reasons) represent decisions where judges chose not to follow
formal institutional sentencing rules. We focus on two interrelated research
questions. First, we expect that judicial departures from Guidelines will
vary across contexts according to judges’ collective perceptions of their
normative legitimacy. In districts where the Guidelines are perceived to be
more valid, utile, or effective, judges will be less likely to depart from them.
Second, we expect that judicial departures from Guidelines will also vary
according to their coercive influences. The stronger the perceived
regulatory force of the Guidelines, the less likely judges will be to deviate
from them. Coercive influences can take several forms, including shared
cultural views of the Guidelines themselves as well as regulatory oversight
from U.S. Attorney’s Offices (USAO) and circuit courts.
61

KRAMER & ULMER, SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 32, at 3–4; JAMES
EISENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 22–30.
62
Brian Johnson et al., The Multilevel Context of Criminal Sentencing: Integrating
Judge and County Level Influences in the Study of Courtroom Decision Making, 44
CRIMINOLOGY 259, 262–63 (2006); Jeffery T. Ulmer et al., Court Communities Under
Sentencing Guidelines: Dilemmas of Formal Rationality and Sentencing Disparity 34
CRIMINOLOGY 383, 399–401 (1996).
63
See, e.g., Ulmer, supra note 47, at 14.
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Although the survey data we examine contain measures that map
directly onto the coercive and normative influences of the Guidelines, our
data does not provide any direct quantitative measures that capture
“mimetic isomorphism”—that is, how the Guidelines might foster
conformity by reducing uncertainty and by devising categories and
classifications that simplify complex decision-making processes.64 We
draw on supplemental interview data from federal judges, prosecutors,
defense attorneys, and probation officers to illustrate our quantitative
findings and to further suggest the potential importance of mimetic,
uncertainty-reduction factors in judicial departures and Guideline
conformity.
II. DATA AND METHODS
Two sources of data are combined in the current study. First,
individual level sentencing data from the USSC are merged for fiscal year
2005 with fiscal year 2007. These data were restricted to district courts
located within the United States, excluding foreign territories. The
sentencing data were limited to cases sentenced after the Booker decision in
January of 2005, which rendered the Guidelines advisory rather than
mandatory, but before the Gall decision in December of 2007, which
widened judicial discretion further than Booker by clarifying that courts
need not presume the Guideline sentences to be reasonable for a given
individual case. This time period encompasses the administration of our
federal court survey and captures the period of flux and legal uncertainty
after Booker rendered the Guidelines advisory, but before Gall and
subsequent decisions clarified what “advisory” meant.65 This is an
important time period because this was potentially a time of uncertainty and
variation among judges in the perceived constraint and normative authority
of the Guidelines.
Second, the individual sentencing data were augmented with survey
data on the cultural milieu of federal district courts. District-level measures
of court culture were created from surveys of federal district judges. As
part of a larger research project, 314 interviews were conducted with federal
court actors in seven geographically dispersed districts of varying size. We
also use the qualitative data to illustrate, contextualize, and elaborate upon

64

See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 17, at 149 (defining and describing the notion of
institutional isomorphism).
65
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005); Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 47 (2007).
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our quantitative findings. In particular, the interview data help to
demonstrate ways that perceptions of the coercive, normative, and mimetic
influences of the Guidelines vary across district courts.66 Information from
these interviews was used to construct a role-specific survey of federal
court actors.67 In the fall of 2005, we sent invitations to participate in this
survey by both email and U.S. mail to all active federal judges. The survey
was also sent to other federal court actors, but given our focus on judgeinitiated Guideline departures, this study relies only on data from federal
judges, which were received between October of 2005 and June of 2006.
Overall, valid survey responses were returned by judges in 82 of the 90
U.S. district courts for a district-level response rate of over 90%. At the
time of the survey there were a total of 639 authorized federal district
judgeships (excluding foreign territories). We received valid responses
from 262 judges, which accounted for over 40% of all federal judges sitting
on the bench at that time. Although the individual-level response rate is
relatively low, a low response rate does not necessarily entail non-response
error or invalidity68; it compares favorably with phone-based public opinion
polls69 and it provides valid survey data for the overwhelming majority of
federal districts, which serve as the primary unit of analysis in the study.
There are no a priori reasons to suspect systematic non-response bias on the
part of federal judges, and there were no discernable statistical differences
across a variety of district-level characteristics for federal courts included in
the sample compared to those that are excluded.70 The number of judge
responses per district varied, which we address through weighting
66

See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 17, at 150.
We pre-tested role-specific drafts of the survey with five judges, eight federal public
defenders or CJA Panel attorneys, and four federal probation officers. Based on their
feedback, we were able to shorten, refine, and clarify the survey. The survey took between
30 to 60 minutes to complete. We developed both a web-based and paper version of the
survey. We obtained names and addresses of all current district court judges from the
Federal Judicial Center (FJC) and sent paper survey packets to all federal district court
judges listed by FJC rosters. An enclosed letter gave them the option of taking the survey on
the web, or taking the enclosed paper version. This was followed by reminder postcards to
non-responders three weeks later and then a duplicate survey packet to remaining nonresponders three weeks after that. A final reminder letter was sent in spring of 2006.
68
See Don Dillman, The Design and Administration of Mail Surveys, 17 ANN. REV. OF
SOC. 225, 229 (1991) (arguing that low response rate does not necessarily entail nonresponse error or invalidity).
69
See PEW RES. CENTER, ASSESSING THE REPRESENTATIVENESS OF PUBLIC OPINION
SURVEYS 1 (2012), http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/Assessing%20the%20Repre
sentativeness%20of%20Public%20Opinion%20Surveys.pdf.
70
See infra Appendix, Table A1.
67
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procedures described below. The complete survey instrument and additional
details about the survey’s sampling, data, and measures are available from
the first author by request. The final sentencing sample includes 162,870
criminal cases sentenced within the 82 federal district courts for which we
have valid survey data.71
A. INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL VARIABLES

The analysis focuses on judicial decisions to conform to or deviate
from the formal sentencing recommendations of the Guidelines. We focus
specifically on downward departures. We do not examine upward
departures (departures above the Guidelines) because they are very rare
(1.6% of cases), and because there is insufficient variation in their
occurrence (i.e., some districts report no upward departures). The
dependent variable separates downward departures by judges (coded 1)
from cases sentenced within the Guidelines (coded 0). It captures other
downward departures controlled by the prosecutor in a third category to
prevent them from being confounded with the primary contrast of interest.
Because our fundamental interest is in the comparison between judgeinitiated departures and conforming cases, we focus our discussion of
findings on this comparison, though complete results for the other contrasts
are available by request.
The federal sentencing data include detailed variables that capture
specific information on socio-demographic offender characteristics, legal
offense characteristics, guidelines calculations, and relevant case-processing
considerations. The presumptive Guideline sentence is utilized to control
for the combined nonlinear effects of offense severity and prior record.72 It
is comprised of the final adjusted minimum months of incarceration
recommended under the Guidelines, after all mitigating and aggravating
factors and statutory trumps (i.e., mandatory minimums) are incorporated.73
It is standardized so a one-unit change reflects one standard deviation. In
line with prior work,74 a separate measure is also included for the six-point
scale that captures defendant criminal history. This did not result in
71

The eight federal districts for which no judge survey data were obtained are
geographically dispersed and diverse in population and socioeconomic characteristics. They
include North Carolina Middle, Tennessee Middle, Idaho, Utah, Hawaii, New York North,
Georgia Middle, and Colorado.
72
Engen & Gainey, supra note 14, at 1208–09.
73
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING, supra note 5,
at 16–18.
74
Johnson et al., supra note 16, at 753.

ULMER_FINAL PROOF_3.30.17

2017]

4/21/2017 3:08 PM

ORGANIZATIONAL CONFORMITY & PUNISHMENT

269

problematic collinearity between the presumptive sentence and criminal
history score (r=.35).
The type of crime is captured by a series of dummy variables for
violent, property, firearms, fraud, immigration, drug, and “other” offenses
with the reference being fraud crime.75 A separate dummy variable is coded
1 for pretrial detainment and 0 for pretrial release. The type of conviction is
captured with a variable coded 1 for bench or jury trials and 0 for guilty
pleas. Dummy variables are also included for the sentencing year to control
for potential temporal variations in sentencing with 2005 as the reference
year. Age of the offender is included as the number of years at the time of
sentencing. Gender is coded 1 for females and 0 for males, and race and
ethnicity are included as a series of dummy variables, for black, Hispanic,
and other race, with white defendants the reference group. A separate
dummy variable is included for citizenship, with non-citizens coded 0 and
U.S. citizens coded 1. Educational attainment is included as a categorical
variable scored 1 for offenders with any college education or higher and 0
for offenders with a high school degree or less. The number of financial
dependents, capped at 10, is also included in the model.
B. DISTRICT-LEVEL VARIABLES

Prior research suggests that jurisdiction size is one of the most
important structural characteristics of criminal courts.76 We therefore
control for district size, as measured by the number of authorized
judgeships in each federal district. We also control for the caseload
pressure of the court,77 operationalized as the number of cases sentenced in
the district during the study period divided by the number of sentencing
judges. Finally, we control for the total crime rate in the district, which is
aggregated to federal districts from county-level Uniform Crime Report
data.
We use aggregated survey items to capture judicial perceptions of
normative versus coercive organizational influences that may encourage
Guidelines conformity or departures. Normative influences tap into judicial
attitudes about the legitimacy, effectiveness and morality of the Guidelines.
Using Likert scales, judges were asked about the extent to which they
75
Other offenses include relatively uncommon crimes not subsumed by the other major
crime categories, such as environmental crimes, pornography and prostitution, and
gambling/lottery offenses.
76
EISENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 283; Jeffery T. Ulmer et al., Sentencing in Context:
A Multilevel Analysis, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 137, 167 (2004).
77
See Dixon, supra note 38, at 1166.
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agreed or disagreed with statements such as: a) “The sentencing
commission has done a pretty remarkable job”; b) “Pre-guidelines there was
great disparity, now disparity is much less”; c) “Congress has spoken and I
have sworn to uphold what they have done”; and d) “The Sentencing
Guidelines have failed to achieve their goals” (reverse coded). These items
are combined into a summative scale capturing the Normative Influence of
the Guidelines (α=.64).
Three additional scales capture different coercive forces that may
affect the judicial use of departures. The first coercive factor, Coercive
Guidelines, captures perceptions of the restrictiveness of the guidelines
(α=.70). Judges were asked to what extent they agreed that: a) “If judges
want to get something done, they can do it”; b) “Judges are regaining
sentencing discretion” under the Guidelines; and c) “Judges have much
more sentencing discretion after the Booker decision.” All items are reverse
coded so higher scores reflect perceptions of less discretion and more
coercion under the Guidelines. A second coercive factor, Coercive USAO,
involves perceptions of the regulatory and coercive influence of the U.S.
Attorney’s Office (α=.60). This measure included three items capturing the
extent to which: a) the “USAO appealed departures routinely”; b) the
degree to which the “U.S. Attorney sets the tone” in the district; and c) the
extent to which the “USAO drives the system” and “is generally
unaccommodating.” A third and final coercive factor, Coercive Circuits,
captures perceptions of the restrictive influence of the circuit courts (α=.64).
This factor consisted of two items. Judges were asked if they agreed that:
a) “Most of the decisions that come out of [this] Circuit wind up being good
for the government”; and the extent to which b) “you had better spell out
your reasons and really lay it out in terms of why a case is outside the
heartland, or else they [the Circuit] will reverse you.”
C. ANALYTIC STRATEGY

This study analyzes judicial Guidelines conformity using hierarchical
generalized linear models. Our analytic strategy captures alternative
departure mechanisms by using a multinomial dependent variable that
separates downward departures initiated by judges from conforming
sentences. We focus the analysis on judge-initiated departures because we
are theoretically interested in the discretionary behavior of federal judges
and because our survey measures of perceptions of Guidelines are specific
to judges. Consistent with prior work on federal departures,78 other
78

See Johnson et al., supra note 16, at 770.
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departures that are controlled by prosecutors are isolated in a separate
category of the dependent variable to prevent them from confounding the
key comparison between judicial departures and non-departures. Full
results are available by request.
The multilevel model accounts for the fact that individual criminal
cases nested within federal courts may share unaccounted-for similarities.
It includes an additional error term to capture district-specific variance, it
corrects misestimated standard errors, and it properly adjusts statistical
significance tests as well as providing additional analytical advantages as
detailed in elsewhere.79 Consistent with prior work,80 we specify a two-level
random-coefficient model with federal cases nested within district courts.81
Equivalent results were obtained using a random-intercept model with fixed
coefficients. All variables are centered on their grand means and robust
standard errors are reported. The coefficients from these models are
exponentiated to produce relative risk ratios.
When using judicial surveys to tap into district court collective
attitudes, it is important to investigate inter-rater agreement in survey
responses among judges within the same district. This is a frequent issue
that arises in organizational research that examines issues such as employee
ratings of workplace climate.82 In our case, multiple federal judges rated
their district court environments. The rWG statistic is the most commonly
used index for evaluating inter-rater agreement when multiple judges rate
the same environmental outcome.83 These statistics are reported in the
Appendix (see Table A2) and show that judges within the same district
courts consistently demonstrate moderate to high agreement in their
responses, with levels of inter-judge agreement falling well within common
standards for justifying the aggregation of individual-level survey data.84
79

Lauren Shermer & Brian Johnson, Criminal Prosecutions: Examining Prosecutorial
Discretion and Charge Reductions in U.S. Federal District Courts, 27 JUSTICE Q. 394, 420–
21 (2010).
80
See, e.g., Lynch & Omori, supra note 51, at 411.
81
The following variables demonstrated significant variation in their effects across
districts and were therefore included as random coefficients: presumptive sentence, criminal
history, multiple counts, pretrial detention, and offender age, gender, race and ethnicity.
82
See, e.g., Charles Glisson et al., The Cross-Level Effects Of Culture And Climate In
Human Service Teams, 23 J. ORG. BEHAV. 767, 780 (2002); L.R. James et al., Estimating
Within-Group Interrater Reliability With And Without Response Bias, 69 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 85, 85 (1984).
83
James L. LeBreton et al., Answers to 20 Questions About Interrater Reliability and
Interrater Agreement, 11 ORGANIZATIONAL RES. METHODS 815, 818 (2008).
84
See id. at 836 (providing useful standards for evaluating the rWG statistic. They
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Furthermore, there is greater between-district variation in judicial responses
than the within-district variation, which suggests that the individual survey
data can be reliably used to tap into meaningful variation in district-level
collective judicial perceptions of the Guidelines.
An additional complication introduced by the use of judicial surveys is
that different districts have varying numbers of judges and varying judicial
response rates. We address this issue by using weighting procedures to
account for differential response rates across districts. The level 2 units
were weighted by overall response rates for each district, so that districts
with higher response rates contribute more to the level 2 estimates.85
Overall, the combination of unique survey data on federal judges’ views of
the Guidelines with actual sentencing data on judicial departure patterns
offers a unique opportunity to investigate the organizational influences that
shape criminal punishment across federal court communities.
Following our discussion of the quantitative analysis, we also present
illustrative material from the interview data noted earlier. We have direct
survey measures that tap into both coercive and normative influences that
may affect Guidelines conformity and departures, but our qualitative data
are useful for also suggesting the potential importance of additional
mimetic, uncertainty-reducing influences not captured by our survey.
III. FINDINGS
A. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS

Table 1 reports the results of descriptive statistics for the individual
and contextual variables examined. The majority of offenders are sentenced
within the recommended Guidelines range, with 13% of offenders receiving
discretionary departures below the guidelines from sentencing judges.
Individual offender characteristics are generally consistent with prior work

suggest that values above .50 indicate at least moderate agreement, while values above .70
suggest strong agreement. All of our aggregated measures exhibited at least moderate
agreement and the majority approached strong levels of agreement.).
85
Comparison of models with and without weighting procedures produced equivalent
findings. Specifically, we examined unweighted models, models weighted by the number of
judge respondents, and models weighted by judicial response rates (reported), all of which
produced similar substantive conclusions. We also investigated various subsets of federal
districts with different numbers of judge respondents and different judicial response rates
and also found the same pattern of results. This suggests our findings are not being driven by
different response rates across districts. These additional models are all available from the
authors by request.
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on federal punishment practices.86 The number of federal judgeships ranges
from a low of 1.5 in the Eastern District of Oklahoma to a high of 28 in
Southern District of New York. Bar graphs for the distributions of the
district-level survey measures are reported in the Appendix and demonstrate
considerable variation across federal districts in both the normative and
coercive factors. To ease interpretation, all of the district-level survey
measures are standardized, with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.
The coefficients for these measures therefore represent the effect that a one
standard deviation increase exerts on the individual odds of receiving a
downward departure from the judge.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Individual and District-Level Predictors
Mean

SD

Min

Max

Judicial Departure

.13

.33

.00

1.00

No Departure

.60

.49

.00

1.00

Other Departure

.27

.44

.00

1.00

Year 2006

.37

.48

.00

1.00

Year 2007

.37

.48

.00

1.00

Presumptive Sentence

62.87

77.19

.00

470.00

Criminal History

2.48

1.73

1.00

6.00

Multiple Counts

.20

.40

.00

1.00

34.93

10.73

16.00

97.00

Female

.13

.34

.00

1.00

Black

.22

.41

.00

1.00

Hispanic

.42

.49

.00

1.00

Other Race

.12

.33

.00

1.00

U.S. Citizen

.69

.46

.00

1.00

Dependents

1.58

1.73

.00

10.00

College Education

.21

.41

.00

1.00

Dependent Variable

Level 1 Predictors

Age

86

Albonetti, supra note 49, at 797; Johnson et al., supra note 16, at 753; Ulmer et al.,
supra note 31, at 1092. In the interest of space, descriptive statistics for reference groups
(i.e., male, white, non-citizen, less than college education, pretrial release, plea conviction,
and fraud offense) are omitted from Table 1. For this reason, some values do not sum to
100%.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Individual and District-Level Predictors
Mean

SD

Min

Max

Presentence Detention

.72

.45

.00

1.00

Trial Conviction

.05

.21

.00

1.00

Violent Offense

.03

.18

.00

1.00

Property Offense

.02

.15

.00

1.00

Drug Offense

.37

.48

.00

1.00

Firearms Offense

.12

.32

.00

1.00

Immigration Offense

.24

.43

.00

1.00

Other Offense

.04

.20

.00

1.00

District Size

.00

1.00

-.92

4.19

Caseload Pressure

.00

1.00

-.97

4.94

Crime Rate

.00

1.00

-2.34

2.97

.00

1.00

-3.42

2.45

Level 2 Predictors

Organizational Factors
Normative Influences
Coercive Guidelines

.00

1.00

-1.62

3.67

Coercive USAO

.00

1.00

-1.92

2.85

Coercive Circuit Court

.00

1.00

-2.14

1.65

B. DOWNWARD DEPARTURES FROM GUIDELINES

Table 2 reports the findings from the random coefficient model for
individual (i.e., level 1) effects on judicial departures from the Guidelines.
The odds of departure are greater for cases with higher presumptive
Guidelines sentences. A one-standard deviation increase in the presumptive
sentence raises the odds of downward departure by 40%. Federal judges
may view very long sentences as overly punitive and longer sentences may
offer greater opportunity for judges to deviate below recommendations. In
general, this effect coincides with findings from nearly all federal
sentencing research—the Guidelines presumptive sentence is among the
strongest predictors of federal punishment outcomes.87 In terms of
87

See, e.g., Kautt supra note 42, at 658; Paula Kautt et al., Cracking Down on Black
Drug Offenders? Testing for Interactions Among Offenders’ Race, Drug Type, and
Sentencing Strategy in Federal Drug Sentences, 19 JUST. 1, 27 (2002); Hartley et al., supra
note 49, at 394–95; Johnson et al., supra note 16, at 768; Spohn & Fornango, supra note 13,
at 814; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 5, at 16–18; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2012
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extralegal offender characteristics, older offenders are slightly more likely
to receive downward departures from judges and female offenders are
notably more likely than male offenders to receive them. Being female
increases the odds of departure by 27%. Black and Hispanic defendants,
however, are significantly less likely to benefit from downward departures.
The odds for black and Hispanic defendants are .81 and .78 times that of
whites respectively. In addition, more educated defendants are also more
likely to benefit from judicial departures; defendants with college schooling
have odds of departure that are 17% greater than defendants without higher
education. These findings are consistent with prior sociological work on
social stratification and inequality in federal punishment.88
Table 2. Hierarchical Generalized Linear Random Coefficient Model
of Judicial Guidelines Downward Departures – Individual-Level Effects

Constant
Level 1 Predictors
Year 2006
Year 2007
Presumptive Sentence×
Criminal History×
Multiple Counts×
Age×
Female×
Black×
Hispanic×
Other Race
U.S. Citizen
Dependents

Judicial Departure 89
SE
Odds
b
-1.76
.08
— ***
-.06
-.02
.34
-.02
-.04
.01
.24
-.21
-.25
-.23
.05
.01

.05
.06
.03
.01
.03
.00
.03
.03
.05
.06
.05
.01

.95
.98
1.40
.98
.96
1.01
1.27
.81
.78
.80
1.05
1.01

***

***
***
***
***
***

REPORT, supra note 6, at 58; Ulmer et al., supra note 11, at 830; Ulmer et al., supra note 31,
at 1098.
88
Albonetti, supra note 49, at 811–12; Johnson et al., supra note 16, at 764;
Steffensmeier et al., supra note 1, at 715–16.
89
To simplify presentation of results, only contrasts between judicial departure and no
departure are reported in this and subsequent tables.
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Table 2. Hierarchical Generalized Linear Random Coefficient Model
of Judicial Guidelines Downward Departures – Individual-Level Effects

College Education
Presentence Detention×
Trial Conviction
Violent Offense
Property Offense
Drug Offense
Firearms Offense
Immigration Offense
Other Offense

Judicial Departure 89
b
SE
Odds
.15
.02
1.17
-.85
.03
.43
-.11
.06
.89
.08
.07
1.08
-.36
.06
.70
.11
.08
1.12
.16
.04
1.17
.27
.09
1.31
.12
.04
1.13
162,870
82
.41 ***

***
***
*
***
***
**
**

N1
N2
District-Level Variance
p ≤ .05** p ≤ .01 *** p ≤ .001
×
Random coefficient varies significantly across districts

Case processing factors also affect the odds of downward departure in
ways consistent with prior literature. For instance, defendants detained
prior to trial are less than half as likely as released defendants to receive
departures, and defendants convicted at trial are also significantly less likely
to receive downward departures. Notable differences also emerge for
different crime categories. Compared to fraud offenders who serve as the
reference group, property offenders are less likely to receive downward
departures whereas individuals convicted for firearms or immigration
crimes are significantly more likely to receive them. The increased odds of
departure for firearms offenses may reflect the especially long federal
mandatory sentences associated with them, whereas departures for
immigration crimes are likely tied to the expedited use of deportation.90

90
Richard Hartley et al., Defending the Homeland: Judicial Sentencing Practices for
Federal Immigration Offenses, 29 JUST. Q. 76, 97–98, 101 (2012).
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Table 3. Hierarchical Generalized Linear Random Coefficient Model of
Judicial Guidelines Departures- District-Level Effects
Judicial Departure
Constant

b

SE

Odds

-1.78

.07

—

***

Level 2 Predictors
District Size

.10

.05

1.10

Caseload Pressure

.03

.02

1.03

-.07

.04

.93

†

Normative Factor

-.11

.05

.89

*

Coercive Guidelines

-.13

.05

.87

**

Coercive USAO

-.05

.06

.95

Coercive Circuit Court

-.18

.04

.84

Crime Rate

*

Organizational Factors

N

1

162,870

N

2

82

District-Level Variance
2

Between-District R

.22

***

***

46%

† p ≤ .10 * p ≤ .05 ** p ≤ .01 *** p ≤ .001
Note: Model includes all level-1 predictors reported in Table 2. Estimates
weighted by district-level response rates.

Table 3 reports the findings for district-level predictors of judicial
departures. To first investigate whether or not the likelihood of departure
varied across courts, we examined unconditional models (not reported in
tabular form) that clearly demonstrated significant variation in the
likelihood of downward departure across federal districts (χ2=6311.4 df=81;
p=.000). This variation remained substantial and statistically significant
after individual level predictors were included in the model (χ2=6031.6;
df=81; p=.000). In fact, the inclusion of individual-level predictors did
little to explain inter-district variation in the judicial use of downward
departures, which suggests that variation is not the product of compositional
differences in case characteristics across courts. To illustrate the magnitude
of inter-district variation in judicial Guidelines circumvention, downward
departures were awarded in only 4% of cases in the Northern District of
Mississippi, but they were meted out in 31% of cases in the Districts of

ULMER_FINAL PROOF_3.30.17

278

4/21/2017 3:08 PM

ULMER & JOHNSON

[Vol. 107

Connecticut and Eastern New York. Because inclusion of the level-2
predictors in the model did not substantively change the estimates for the
level-1 variables, Table 3 is restricted to the district-level effects.
More favorable perceptions of the Guidelines reflected in the
normative factor are associated with increased guidelines conformity. That
is, stronger normative views of the Guidelines reduce the likelihood of
judicial departures. A one standard deviation increase in the normative scale
reduces the odds of downward departure by a factor of .89. Coercive
influences tied to the Guidelines and circuit courts are also associated with
decreased odds of judicial departure. Downward departures are less likely
in judicial districts where the Guidelines are perceived to be more
restrictive. A one standard deviation increase in the perceived coerciveness
of the Guidelines multiplies the odds of departure by a factor of .87. Even
larger effects emerge for the perceived coercive power of circuit courts. In
districts where judges view the circuit as more conservative and more likely
to reverse their decisions they are less likely to grant departure sentences.
A one standard deviation increase in the perceived coerciveness of the
circuit multiplies the odds of downward departure by .84, after accounting
for individual-level offense and offender characteristics. The effect for
perceived coerciveness of U.S. Attorneys’ Offices was also in the expected
direction, suggesting more coercive offices are negatively associated with
judicial departures, but this effect failed to achieve statistical significance.91
Judicial perceptions of the coerciveness of the Guidelines could be the
product of historical patterns of guideline departures in the district. To
investigate this issue, we estimated supplemental models that controlled for
prior pre-Booker departure rates of districts (FY2003–FY2004). Although
this measure was, as one would expect, positively related to the odds of
downward departure (b=.09; SE=.01; p≤.001), it had virtually no effect on
the estimate for judicial perceptions of the coerciveness of the Guidelines
(b=-14; SE=0.04; p≤.001). This shows that judicial perceptions of the
coercive influence of the Guidelines influence departure independent of
time-stable differences between districts that might also influence the
likelihood of departures.
Some of our district level control variables also demonstrate
noteworthy effects. Larger districts are more likely to grant judicial

91

Additional analyses (not reported) also investigated potential interactions between
extralegal offender characteristics and district-level organizational factors. Few of these
interactions were statistically significant and none were substantively large. These analyses
are not reported but are available from the first author by request.
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departures. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in the number of
judgeships increases the odds of departure by 10%. District-level crime
rates are also marginally related to the odds of judicial departure, with each
unit increase associated with a 7% decrease in the odds of judicial
departure.
Overall, the findings for inter-district variation in judicial departures
provide support for the importance of normative perceptions of the
guidelines and for the influence of coercive forces that contextualize the
individual sentencing landscape across federal district courts. Collectively,
the district-level predictors explained 45% of the total inter-district
variation in judicial downward departures. Results of this study provide
clear evidence of contextual variation in judicial conformity to the
Guidelines. Inter-district variation in judicial departures remained highly
significant even after accounting for a broad array of relevant offense and
offender considerations. To place the magnitude of this variation in
additional context, the mean probability of receiving a judge-initiated
downward departure varied between 8% and 25% across one standard
deviation of federal district courts, and it varied between 4% and 39%
across two standard deviations.92
Judicial perceptions and attitudes toward the Guidelines were strongly
related to the likelihood of downward departure across districts. Judges in
districts that attached greater normative and moral force to the Guidelines
were less likely to deviate from them. Court contexts where the Guidelines
were viewed as more effective and legitimate were also characterized by
lower odds of judicial departure. Taken as a whole, these findings suggest
that important district variance exists in judicial attitudes regarding the
normative and coercive force attached to the Guidelines as well as in
attitudes toward circuit courts and their likelihood of reversal on appeal.
IV. QUALITATIVE INSIGHTS
We conducted more than 300 qualitative, open-ended interviews with
federal court actors in eight geographically-dispersed districts, and these
offer additional insights into these and related sources of contextual
variation in organizational conformity to the Guidelines (the interviews
were collected on the condition that the names of individuals and of
districts would be kept anonymous). The interviews highlight important
92

These estimates are derived by setting all individual-level predictors in the model to
their means and then using the district-level variance component to calculate one and two
standard deviation increases and decreases in the probability of departure.
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themes involving normative constraint, coercive social forces, and also
mimetic, uncertainty-reducing influences that affect organizational
conformity and deviation from the Guidelines. The interviews suggest that
these three types of influence often operate distinctively, but can also
combine in unique ways to shape district-level conformity to and departure
from the Guidelines.
A. VARIATION IN NORMATIVE CONSTRAINT

Consistent with our quantitative findings, the interview data suggest
that many judges clearly recognize the moral force and normative
constraints of the Guidelines. A judge in one medium-sized southeastern
district, for instance, noted that there are “fairly decent guidelines on when
you may depart downwardly,” and he went on to say
I don’t look at the downward departure provisions of the Guidelines as an excuse for
me to impose my own type of sentence and find some colorful basis for downward
departure, even when I believe the U.S. Attorney isn’t going to fuss about it. I don’t
do that. I sort of go by the book as much as I can.

Another judge in the same district stated: “I was skeptical of the Guidelines
at first, largely, because of the bureaucratic nature of them. But I do feel
that a core value of uniformity in sentencing and certainty in sentencing are
both things that I believe in.”
A judge in a large southern district similarly articulated a mixture of
normative and coercive reasons for avoiding departures from the
Guidelines:
I like the Guidelines. I ask what is happening nationwide? And what does Congress
want us to do? I respect that. They force us to give reasons why we sentence the way
that we do and I think that is good. There are no crazy sentences. The Guidelines
eliminated extremes, and if you give an extreme you’ve got to say why. And there is
almost no reason to. The Guidelines keep us humble, and most say that judges could
use to be humbled.

By contrast, some judges in other districts seemed more critical of the
Guidelines on normative grounds, expressing clear willingness to depart.
For example, a judge in a large west coast district stated, “This is the
‘anguish of the drug war.’ You want to ameliorate the excessiveness of the
penalties through departures. . . . If they have more than their share of
hardships I will take a look at their circumstances.”
Similarly, a judge in a small northeast district noted his respect and
appreciation for the Guidelines, but expressed clear willingness to depart
from them when necessary and believed that the normative credibility of the
Guidelines was enhanced by allowing departures. He admitted:
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I am perceived as being somewhat overly sensitive to the human qualities of the
individual defendant. You know, it would be nice if there were more departures. I
am an advocate for judicial discretion within the parameters of the Guideline system.
I believe in the Guidelines. I think they’re great. But I think more flexibility gives
them greater credibility.

As these brief quotations suggest, judges recognize the moral and
normative force of the Guidelines, even though there are clear inter-district
variations in their perceptions of the ability and need for sentences that
depart from them.
B. VARIATION IN COERCIVE CONSTRAINT

Our quantitative findings also indicated that districts that viewed the
Guidelines as more restrictive and less flexible and those that perceived the
circuit courts to be less supportive and more likely to reverse decisions
were less likely to depart from the Guidelines. The interviews clearly
contained differing themes about coercive pressures across court contexts.
One judge in a medium-sized southeastern district expressed disdain for the
federal justice system’s efforts to promote conformity. He noted:
Lots of offices are trying to tell judges what to do. Federal Judicial Center (FJC),
Administrative Office of U.S. Courts (AOUSC). I don’t know if it’s affecting people
but they’re trying. They make judges go to trainings, conferences. Always a press for
uniformity. There are bulletins from the FJC, school for new judges . . . et cetera.

A number of court actors also recognized that the circuit courts loomed
large in their decisions to depart from the Guidelines. Reflecting on
departures in one particular circuit, a judge in a large midwestern district
noted that: “[t]he attitude among district judges is that the [Xth] Circuit is
nasty on downward departures,” and that
has a deterrent effect on district judges. The [Xth] Circuit is very conservative. I
think a lot of judges, if they didn’t have to worry about that, they would depart
because you really need to look at these situations on an individual case-by-case basis.
You can’t look at every, you know, all these drug crimes as being all the same,
because they’re not. Same with bank robbery cases, same with everything.
Everything.

In contrast, other circuit court environments were perceived to be far less
constraining with regard to judicial departure decisions. According to a
judge in a medium-sized northeastern district:
You have seen more downward departures. That statistic is on the up. But all that
shows is that we follow the law. Since they said you can do it, we do it. But when
they were saying we couldn’t, you didn’t see very many departures. Judges are pretty
staunch about following the law, me included. We whine, we complain, but we
follow it. [Our Circuit] has always said our discretion is the key.
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He elaborated that judges could “try to get them to see and to convince
them that if you do see it as unusual as we see it, then that is a proper
judicial function to depart. And you won’t be reversed. Be confident in
that.” Another judge in the same circuit, but a different district similarly
noted:
If I tend to think that I’m a little vulnerable [in my departure reasoning] . . . I’ll throw
in totality of circumstances. It’s pretty tough to lose under totality of circumstances.
You know, they make the circumstances unusual. Very seldomly will the [Yth]
Circuit reverse. [sic]

These statements illustrate that judges are aware of the coercive power
of circuit courts to reverse their departure decisions, and they further
highlight the variation that exists in these perceptions across district court
contexts. Similar views were expressed by other federal court actors as
well. The U.S. Attorney in a medium-sized southern district, for instance,
noted that “The [Zth] Circuit is fairly strict constructionists on statutory
interpretation. It is very pro-sentencing Guidelines. It reads them very
strictly and that’s a blessing to the prosecution because we . . . can appeal
departures and don’t have to worry, ‘what’s the Circuit going to do?’”
In contrast, a U.S. Attorney in a large west coast district took a more
“middle of the road” stance on appealing departures and stated, “Generally,
I think my sense is unless it’s a really bad decision, truly out of bounds, that
we won’t appeal.” In this district, the U.S. Attorney’s office was relatively
uninterested in appealing judicial departures. The U.S. Attorney continued,
noting the stance of the circuit and stating “The judges here shouldn’t be
feeling that they don’t have sufficient discretion . . . because they’ve
exercised it and we have challenged them very rarely on that exercise of
discretion. It’s a tough challenge to make in [our] Circuit anyway.” He
concluded, “if a judge is articulate enough, he [sic] can justify a departure
that will withstand the power of review in any appellate case.” Finally, a
judge in another northeastern district expressed the broad acceptability of
departures in his district, noting that:
There is not a single case with the exception of a mandatory minimum case . . . where
there’s no [defense] request for departure of some kind. I will say that in many ways,
very often, the majority of cases in which I depart the government agrees. I’ve been a
judge for 7 years; the government’s appealed me once.

C. MIMETIC INFLUENCE: THE UNCERTAINTY REDUCTION INFLUENCE
OF GUIDELINES

Although our quantitative analysis did not have direct measures of
mimetic influences affecting Guideline conformity and departures, many of
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our interviews contained important themes related to them. All sentencing
guidelines reduce uncertainty by categorizing offenses and offenders and by
making bounded sentence recommendations in connection with those
classifications.93 The federal Guidelines provide an “anchoring structure”
that defines the parameters of applicable sentences in ways that help
simplify complex decision-making processes—they categorize cases and
provide enhanced predictability and reduced uncertainty in punishment.
The interview data suggest an important role for this kind of mimetic,
uncertainty-reducing influence. One prominent theme that emerged was the
important role of the Guidelines in simplifying sentencing and reducing
uncertainty through the categorization and ranking of offenses, offenders,
and sentences. Regardless of individual opinions about whether the
Guidelines were too harsh or not, there was broad consensus that the
Guidelines did in fact help to anchor sentencing decisions while reducing
unwanted uncertainty. For example, one federal probation officer in a
medium-sized northeastern district even complained that:
The Guidelines have reduced . . . judges to a “cookbook mentality.” If it calls for a
tablespoon they are not going to alter that. The Guidelines provide a recipe for
judges. It’s easy, a judge can look at it and say, “Guidelines say this, this is what I am
going to do, I don’t have to think about adapting them to something else.” . . . If we
stopped sending pre-sentences to the court [containing Guideline calculations], some
of the judges would be totally lost.

Two judges in a large midwestern district characterized the usefulness of
the Guidelines for cognitively structuring decision making as follows:
I’m not one of those people who rail against the Guidelines like a lot of other people
do, and I actually think the goals of it are good because I certainly think that when I
was a prosecutor, you know, generally they did it by sort of a gestalt. Now there is a
framework. . . . And I think that they’re good because maybe they sort of give
guidance to everybody and to the court.
My attitude towards the Guidelines has evolved over the years, judges who entered
the bench before the Guidelines have a very different view, they chafe, they hate
them, blah, blah, blah. I came on the bench after. I don’t feel the same, it is not as
personal to me, all I know about is the Guidelines . . . I view the Guidelines as a tool
to achieve a just result. I try to do the right thing while trying to apply the Guidelines.

A judge in the medium southwestern district largely agreed and noted that:
See, I started my career after the Guidelines came into effect and I never had the
power that my colleagues who set forth periods of time before the Guidelines went
into effect had. I never had the power of discretion, so I never felt the loss of
discretion. I think the Guidelines conceptually are a good idea.
93

KRAMER & ULMER, SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 32, at 26–32.
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A U.S. Attorney in a large midwestern district noted that not only are
the Guidelines cognitive decision-making aids, but they also ease the
emotional burden of having to decide punishments on their own:
Some of them [judges] are relieved that they do not have as much discretion. There
are some district court judges who like the sentencing guidelines because they don’t
like to make the hard decisions. Guidelines relieved them of a lot of that. You talk to
judges over drinks and some tell you that their brothers and sisters for the most part
love them, it takes the burden off their shoulders. They love the fact that they don’t
have to make these hard calls. But then there are some that realize that, “Jesus, this is
my job.” I am sure it is those guys that are doing the departures.

A judge in a large southern district agreed with the U.S. Attorney above: “I
think eventually for many judges the guidelines provide some insulation
from kind of the raw human pain that is involved in sentencing somebody.”
In addition, a judge in a northeastern district elaborated on this theme of
how Guidelines simplify sentencing both cognitively and emotionally:
I think initially the judges were overwhelmingly pleased with Guidelines because it’s
a tremendous moral burden to carry around with you. To pronounce these sentences
on people like they’re coming out of your head, and that’s what you’re doing, and you
have to sleep with it at night, and wasn’t it wonderful to have a set of guidelines that
almost mathematically told you what the sentence was, and therefore it absolved you,
basically, of the moral responsibility, to some extent, of whether the sentence was too
harsh, whether you should have considered some of these other factors, yadda, yadda,
yadda.

Like some of the quotes above, additional insights from an
experienced Chief Federal Defender in a small southern district contrasted
older judges, who sentenced pre-Guidelines, to judges appointed later, who
leaned on and embraced the Guidelines. He noted that for “District court
judges who were on the bench in the past, the Guidelines were painful. The
judges were resentful of the Guidelines.” However, over time his district
established “a very strict routine under the Guidelines” in which judges are
expected to “just follow the rules,” and he explained:
The rules do not look as problematic to them [newer judges] as they do to somebody
who came before them. [The Guidelines] gave them structure. The newer judges
have never had the option to do anything else . . . they lean on the Guidelines a lot
more than judges did that were on the bench when the guidelines became effective. It
seems to me like before, the [old] judges were often looking for an excuse to do
something outside the Guidelines. Where now, with these [newer] judges, you really
have to show them something that tells them that they should do this [depart below
Guidelines], you know. They still may say, “Well, I recognize that I have this
discretion, but I choose not to use it.”

Finally, the Chief Federal Defender in a small northeastern district
contrasted her experience in her current and former districts. She perceived
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that judges in her former district uncritically followed the Guidelines
because it was cognitively (and perhaps emotionally) easier to do so. She
appreciated that judges in her current district felt free to depart from the
Guidelines:
I’ve seen judges that I think hide behind the Guidelines . . . rather than be creative or
interpret the Guidelines in a judicial fashion, I’ve seen judges hiding behind them.
“Sorry, I’ve washed my hands on this one.” I saw that a lot in [former district]. Some
judges would do mass sentencings, 20 or 30 hearings a day, and just read out centuries
of time.

In her current district, she felt the judges were “open to sentencing
arguments” and “they did their judicial duty to find departures where there
was a reason.” These comments comparing two different districts highlight
both the general importance of mimetic, uncertainty-reducing influences in
guidelines conformity, and also the notable differences that can occur in
these justifications and in the use of Guidelines departures across federal
court communities.
CONCLUSION
We argue that the federal courts represent an important organizational
field in which local norms and organizational influences play a key role in
explaining conformity to, and deviation from, institutional rules. U.S.
district courts can be seen as local organizational arenas whose punishment
decisions are subject to a set of overarching field-wide rules—i.e.,
sentencing Guidelines—that constrain judicial discretion with a mixture of
regulative, normative, and mimetic social force. District courts are inhabited
by court actors who make sense of formal institutional rules through the
lens of locally-interpreted organizational norms and expectations.
We investigate these social influences, focusing on different types of
organizational pressure for judicial conformity to the Guidelines. We
measure one specific aspect of that organizational culture relevant to federal
courts and their relationship with the Guidelines: the collective judicial
attitudes about the Guidelines’ normative and coercive influences. We
examine normative influences that encourage conformity through the
perceived moral force and legitimacy of the Guidelines, as well as coercive
influences that encourage Guideline conformity through various types of
regulative constraints. Our interview data help to illustrate these influences
and also raise the potential importance of additional, mimetic forces, or
cultural-cognitive pressures toward conformity that are rooted in
organizational goals of decision-making efficiency and uncertainty
reduction.
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Our results are consistent with prior socio-legal research that suggests
local court actors often implement formal legal policies in locally distinct
ways.94 Indeed, our findings suggest district court sentencing practices are
coupled to the Guidelines to varying degrees, depending on judicial
interpretations and perceptions of the Guidelines and on surrounding
pressures to conform to them. The collective perceptions among judges of
the Guidelines as normatively legitimate, their definitions of the
coerciveness of the Guidelines and the local circuit court climate, are all
intimately related to contextual patterns of Guidelines conformity. In short,
our analysis implies that the federal criminal justice system and its
sentencing Guidelines represent an “inhabited institution,”95 where local
actors’ efforts at sense-making produce important variation in punishment
outcomes for individual defendants.
The court communities’ perspective views courts as open systems
within organizational fields, influencing and being influenced by their
surrounding socio-political contexts. Thus, we do not wish to argue that
collective judicial attitudes, as a measure of one component of court
community culture, exist in isolation of broader influences. Much research
demonstrates that courts vary substantially in their sentencing practices in
connection with factors like court caseloads and crime dynamics,
surrounding political features, the size of local racial and ethnic minority
populations, local religious climate, and others.96 Thus, judicial attitudes
about the normative value and coercive influence of the Guidelines are
quite likely shaped by factors both internal and external to the courthouse
itself. However, empirically assessing the influences on the judicial
attitudes themselves is beyond the scope of this study.
Despite its unique contributions, our study has other important
limitations as well. The use of judge surveys to tap into local court
organizational culture comes with limitations tied to survey research. As
with any survey instrument, nonresponse bias, measurement error and
cognitive biases may affect our measures of court culture. The fact that our
results are not sensitive to different response rates (see Appendix,
Table A3) provides some assurance against these concerns, though it will
be important for future work to replicate these findings. Another notable
limitation of our data is that we cannot connect individual judge survey
94

Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 16, at 547–49; Johnson et al., supra note 16, at 767–
68; Lynch & Omori, supra note 51, at 411.
95
See Tim Hallett, The Myth Incarnate: Recoupling Processes, Turmoil, and Inhabited
Institutions in an Urban Elementary School, 75 AM. SOC. REV. 52, 53 (2010).
96
Ulmer, supra note 47, at 13–16.
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responses to individual judges’ sentences. The USSC does not publicly
release data on individual sentences by judge nor do they publicly provide
anonymous judge identifiers.97 If future research could obtain judge
identifiers, and could connect individual judge attitudinal or other survey
measures to individual judges’ sentencing decisions, this would be a major
contribution to the literature.
Future work could expand on this research in several other productive
directions. First, we focus only on collective judicial perceptions and their
effects on judicial departures from guidelines. However, the incorporation
of perceptions from other court actors could broaden the scope of the
current work and open the door for additional lines of inquiry. For instance,
prosecutor surveys could be used to inform our understanding of
prosecutor-controlled departures, especially since these types of departures
are frequently embedded in the guilty plea process. Second, our focus on
Guideline departures reflects organizational perspectives on the tension
between formal institutional rules and local court actor behavior,98 but it is
important to recognize that judges make several other consequential
decisions that are also embedded in the local culture of the court.
Predominant case processing strategies, pretrial decisions, and other
punishment outcomes, such as the likelihood and length of incarceration
should be examined in future work on the organizational contexts of
sentencing.
As described at the outset, the Guidelines were once mandatory, but
the 2005 Booker decision ruled the Guidelines advisory and restored
considerable sentencing discretion to federal judges, which weakened their
coercive power to restrict departures as a matter of law.99 Yet, recent
research shows that the Guidelines continue to exert strong influence on
federal sentencing, and while judge-initiated departures have increased
compared to pre-Booker years, the large majority of sentences conform to
the Guidelines.100 We suspect that this is because the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines do not merely, or even now primarily, influence through

97
Max Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Reviewing the Sentencing Guidelines:
Judicial Politics, Empirical Evidence, and Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV., 715, 720–29 (2008).
98
See generally JAMES MARCH & HERBERT SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS (1958) (on formal
and informal organizational rules and decision-making).
99
Stith, supra note 25, at 1477.
100
Kaiser & Spohn, supra note 12, at 261–62; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N’S 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 35 (2011), http://www.ussc.gov/about/2015annual-report/archive/annual-report-2011; Ulmer et al., supra note 11, at 830; Ulmer et al.,
supra note 31, at 1098.
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regulative constraint, but also through informal normative influence, and
perhaps mimetic influence (by providing useful tools to manage
uncertainty). Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have made it clear that
judges need not presume that the Guidelines are reasonable sentences in
given cases,101 and that judges may depart from the Guidelines if they
disagree with them on policy grounds.102 Therefore, the regulatory influence
of the Guidelines has been significantly reduced, which likely makes
normative influences more important in constraining judicial departures.
Our interview data further suggest that the Guidelines also serve an
important uncertainty-reducing function, and that district courts’ reliance on
them illustrates a form of mimetic isomorphism.103
Additional research is therefore necessary to examine the complex
interplay between legal shifts in sentencing policy and patterns of
conformity to institutional rules such as the Guidelines. In the wake of not
only Booker, but subsequent decisions104 that occurred after our survey was
collected, local organizational contexts may become even more important
as the Guidelines’ formal legal constraints are further weakened. This
suggests that court conformity to the Guidelines may depend increasingly
on their normative or mimetic (e.g., uncertainty reduction) influences.
Thus, to the extent that the Guidelines have become embedded in
federal sentencing practice as anchoring rules and normative standards, they
will continue to shape the landscape of federal sentencing, but they may
increasingly be subject to local interpretation and adaptation. In some ways,
the role of normative influence may be especially important. For instance,
Kaiser and Spohn105 recently found that district judges around the country
have expressed policy disagreements with the Guidelines’
recommendations for non-production child pornography sentences by
departing downward at very high rates. Such policy disagreement
departures may become more common,106 reflecting the reduced coercive
influence of the contemporary Guidelines. This also suggests that the
Guidelines may exert very different levels of normative influence over
101

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 39, 50 (2007).
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101 (2007).
103
Ulmer, supra note 4, at 255–56.
104
See, e.g., Gall, 552 U.S. at 38–39; Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 85–89; Rita v. United
States, 551 U.S. 338, 338–40 (2007).
105
Kaiser & Spohn, supra note 12, at 262; see also Carissa Byrne Hessick,
Disentangling Child Pornography from Child Sex Abuse, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 853, 853, 887
(2011).
106
Kaiser & Spohn, supra note 12, at 259.
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sentencing for different crimes. A few years ago, the USSC requested that
Congress direct district courts to give the Guidelines “substantial weight” in
sentencing decisions, to provide a “presumption of reasonableness”
standard to Guidelines sentences, and to provide a “heightened standard of
review” for departure sentences based on policy disagreements.107 Our
research here implies that in the contemporary context, a major way to
encourage district courts to give the Guidelines substantial weight would be
to listen to the signals that judge-initiated departures send, because these
may indicate an important lack of normative alignment between specific
Guideline sentences and the attitudes of district judges. Seen this way,
judicial departures are not necessarily indicative of troublesome
noncompliance with the Guidelines, but instead have normative feedback
value.

107

(2012).

Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1631, 1730–32
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APPENDIX: DISTRICT COMPARISONS, INTER-RATER AGREEMENT,
WEIGHTING AND BAR CHARTS
Table A1. Comparison of Federal Districts with and without Judicial
Survey Responses
Included
Excluded
Districts
Districts
T-Test
(n=82)
(n=8)
Statistic
District Characteristics
Mean
Mean
Total Crime Rate
Number of Judgeships
Total Departure Rate
Judge Departure Rate
Caseload Pressure (cases
per judge)
Total Population
% Black Population
% Hispanic Population
Median Household Income
% Population in Poverty
% Male Judges in District
% White Judges in District
% Black Judges in District

36.41
7.56
.35
.11
333.01

37.57
4.25
.37
.10
368.40

-.23
1.62
-.42
.22
-.35

3,461,394
13.28%
9.81%
$49,130.84
13.7%

2,528,178
10.30%
8.67%
$50,696.73
12.6%

.89
.70
.28
-.50
.89

79.2%
86.0%
9.3%

86.7%
86.1%
10.8%

-1.13
-.02
-.38

Table A2. Inter-rater Agreement for Survey Measures
Aggregated to District Level
rWG index
Mean
SD
Organizational Factors
Normative Factor
.69
.27
Coercive Guidelines
.51
.35
Coercive Circuit Court
.69
.27
Coercive USAO
.76
.25
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Table A3. Comparison of District Organizational Factors for
Weighted and Unweighted Estimates
Judicial Departures
Model 1
Weighted by District
Response Rate
b
SE
Odds
Constant
-1.78
.07
-- ***
Level 2 Predictors
District Size
.10
.05
1.11 *
Caseload Pressure
.03
.02
1.03
Crime Rate
-.07
.04
.93 †
Organizational Factors
Normative Factor
-.11
.05
.90 *
Coercive Guidelines
-.13
.05
.88 **
Coercive USAO
-.05
.06
.95
Coercive Cir. Court
-.18
.04
.84 ***
1
N
162,870
N2
82
† p ≤ .10 * p ≤ .05** p ≤ .01 *** p ≤ .001
Note: Models include all additional level-1 predictors reported in
Tables 2 & 3
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Table A3. Comparison of District Organizational Factors for
Weighted and Unweighted Estimates Cont’d
Judicial Departures
Model 2
Un-weighted
Estimates
b
SE
Odds
Constant
-1.76
.06
-- ***
Level 2 Predictors
District Size
.13
.04
1.14 **
Caseload Pressure
.00
.04
1.00
Crime Rate
-.06
.04
.94 †
Organizational Factors
Normative Factor
-.13
.05
.88 *
Coercive Guidelines
-.10
.05
.90 *
Coercive USAO
-.05
.05
.95
Coercive Cir. Court
-.21
.05
.81 ***
1
N
162,870
N2
82
† p ≤ .10 * p ≤ .05** p ≤ .01 *** p ≤ .001
Note: Models include all additional level-1 predictors reported in
Tables 2 & 3

